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Abstract 
On May 13, 1999, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued a Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) on Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO).  The 
purpose of the NOPR is to solicit comments on proposed FERC regulatory rules that 
would encourage transmission system owners to participate in regional transmission 
organizations.  Such organizations would manage various aspects of the operation and 
expansion of the nation’s high-voltage electricity transmission system to support 
developing competitive wholesale and retail electric generation service markets that rely 
on these transmission networks.  Regional integration of transmission systems is thought 
to be required in order to manage more effectively transmission network operations, to 
internalize various network externalities, and to facilitate the development of competitive 
electricity markets.  The FERC initiative aims to speed the development of such regional 
organizations.  I prepared the attached comments in response to FERC’s RTO NOPR.  
My comments focus primarily on the future structure of the regulatory framework that 
governs how transmission system owners and operators will be compensated for 
providing transmission service.  I also present a framework for evaluating the benefits 
and costs of not-for-profit ISOs that operate transmission facilities owned and maintained 
by others vs. for-profit Independent Transmission Companies (Transcos) that own, 
maintain, and operate their own transmission facilities. 
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On May 13, 1999 the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued a 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) on Regional Transmission Organizations 
(RTO).  The purpose of the NOPR is to seek comments on proposed FERC regulatory 
rules that would encourage transmission system owners to participate in regional 
transmission organizations.  Such organizations would manage various aspects of the 
operation and expansion of the nation’s high voltage electric transmission system to 
support developing competitive wholesale and retail electric generation service markets 
that rely on these transmission networks.  Regional integration of transmission systems is 
thought to be required to manage more effectively transmission network operations, to 
internalize various network externalities, and to facilitate the development of competitive 
electricity markets.  Five non-profit Independent System Operators (ISOs) have already 
been created from the three existing tight power pools covering the Northeastern states 
and in California and Texas.  However, the development of similar RTOs in other parts 
of the country has been slow.  The FERC initiative aims at speeding up the development 
of such regional organizations. 
I prepared the attached comments in response to FERC’s RTO NOPR.  My 
comments focus primarily on the future structure of the regulatory framework that 
governs how transmission owners and operators will be compensated for providing 
transmission service.  I also present a framework for evaluating the benefits and costs of 
not-for-profit ISOs that operate transmission facilities owned and maintained by others 
vs. for-profit Independent Transmission Companies (Transcos) that own, maintain, and 
operate their own transmission facilities. 
The success of the ongoing restructuring of the nation’s electricity sector and its 
reliance on decentralized competitive generation service markets depends heavily on the 
existence of a robust transmission network that operates efficiently.  Indeed, the new 
decentralized industry structure, with a large number of economic agents pursuing their 
own self interests, requires a more robust transmission network and enhanced operating 
capabilities than was the case during the era of vertically integrated regulated 
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monopolies.  Recent historical evidence suggests, however, that resources devoted to 
maintaining, operating, and expanding the nation’s transmission networks are declining 
rather than increasing in relative terms.   
Continuing to rely on FERC’s historical transmission regulatory framework is not 
likely to foster the kind of robust transmission networks that are required to support 
efficient competitive electricity markets.  Traditional transmission regulatory procedures 
pay too much attention to the direct costs of transmission (capital and operating costs) 
and too little attention to the indirect costs of transmission (congestion, ancillary services, 
and local market power mitigation costs).  It is very important for the FERC to adopt new 
regulatory mechanisms that provide transmission owners and operators with powerful 
economic incentives to operate transmission networks efficiently and to invest the 
resources necessary to expand their capabilities efficiently. These incentives should be an 
integral component of a performance-based regulatory (PBR) framework for the 
regulation of transmission rates that rewards transmission owners for achieving these 
objectives and penalizes them for failing to do so. 
There is a growing debate over whether RTOs should be non-profit ISOs or for-
profit Transcos or some combination of the two organizational forms.  This debate raises 
important issues, though the signal to noise ratio that has characterized this debate has not 
been very high.  There are potentially significant costs resulting from the separation of 
ownership and maintenance decisions from transmission operating decisions, as is the 
case with ISOs.  On the other hand, there are potential benefits associated with 
independence of the transmission operator from generation and marketing activities and 
the internalization of significant regional loop flow and related network externalities 
within a single organization.  There are significant incentive issues that must be 
addressed both for non-profit ISOs and for-profit Transco monopolies.  Viewed properly, 
it is not so much a choice between a not-for-profit ISO and a for-profit Transco, as it is a 
choice about the distribution of responsibilities between them. 
It would be desirable for FERC to adopt the following transmission regulatory 
policies: 
h  FERC should adopt regulatory mechanisms that provide transmission owners and 
operators with powerful economic incentives to operate transmission networks 
efficiently and to invest the resources necessary to expand their capabilities 
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efficiently. These incentives should be an integral component of a performance-
based regulatory (PBR) framework for the regulation of transmission rates that 
rewards transmission owners for achieving these objectives and penalizes them 
for failing to do so. 
h  FERC should develop and apply new regulatory mechanisms that pay more attention 
to the indirect costs of transmission (congestion, ancillary services, and local 
market power mitigation costs) which are growing rapidly.  It should pay less 
attention to the direct costs of transmission (capital and operating costs) which are 
small.  A good regulatory mechanism should give transmission owners and 
operators a financial stake in reducing the aggregate direct and indirect costs 
associated with the operation of and investments in transmission. 
h  While third parties should be given the opportunity to propose market-based private 
initiatives to expand transmission capacity, incumbent transmission owners, in the 
context of a sound regional planning process, must be relied upon to play a central 
role in expanding the transmission system. 
h  If the ownership of transmission assets in a region is highly balkanized and vertical 
integration between transmission and generation is extensive, then ISOs will need 
to play a significant operating role in the region to meet the Commission’s 
objectives.  Defining clear performance objectives for the ISO, implementing a 
good governance framework, monitoring ISO managerial performance in light of 
these objectives, rewarding management for good performance and disciplining 
management for poor performance will be a difficult but important challenge in 
this case.   
h  If transmission owners shed their control over generating assets and the ownership of 
transmission assets in a region is not highly balkanized so that loop flow and other 
network externalities are largely internalized, there is a strong case for shifting 
more operating responsibilities to for-profit Transcos, in the context of a good 
PBR mechanism. The ISO/RTO’s independent role would then properly shrink to 
deal with any remaining significant network externalities or boundary problems 
and to encompass any necessary non-operational monitoring, review, and dispute 
resolution tasks which the Commission may want to assign to them. 
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COMMENTS OF PROFESSOR PAUL L. JOSKOW1 
Pursuant to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR), 64 Fed. Reg. 31390 
(May 13, 1999), I am pleased to have the opportunity to offer my comments on issues 
and proposed policies regarding Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs).  It is 
important that the Commission implement policies that break down the remaining 
barriers to the continued evolution of efficient competitive wholesale electricity markets.  
Such policies are essential so that the ongoing restructuring of the US electricity sector 
can be successful in bringing long term economic benefits to consumers.  I support 
policies that stimulate the creation of additional RTOs in the regions where they do not 
already exist (in the form of ISOs) and which meet the general objectives and criteria 
discussed in the NOPR. 
 The NOPR addresses a large number of important interrelated issues and policy 
proposals regarding the organizational structure and regulatory framework that should 
govern transmission networks that support decentralized competitive markets for electric 
generation services.  My comments will focus primarily on the future structure of the 
regulatory framework that governs how transmission owners and operators will be 
compensated for providing transmission service and those portions of the NOPR that 
                                               
1 Elizabeth and James Killian Professor of Economics and Management and Director, Center for Energy 
and Environmental Policy Research at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Cambridge, 
MA.  I am submitting these comments on my own behalf.  The views expressed here are my own and 
should not be interpreted as representing the views of MIT or any other organization with which I am 
affiliated.  I have benefited greatly from my discussions with Jean Tirole and Thomas-Olivier Nasser 
about incentive regulation for transmission owners and from unpublished research on incentive regulation 
of transmission companies by Ingo Vogelsang. 
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relate to these issues.2  Specifically, I believe that it is very important for the Commission 
to adopt regulatory mechanisms that provide transmission owners and operators with 
powerful economic incentives to operate transmission networks efficiently and to invest 
the resources necessary to expand their capabilities efficiently.  These incentives should 
be an integral component of a performance-based regulatory (PBR) framework for the 
regulation of transmission rates that rewards transmission owners for achieving these 
objectives and penalizes them for failing to do so.3  While I believe that my suggestions 
are fully consistent with the Commission’s earlier Transmission Policy Statement (FERC 
Stats. & Regs. at 31,145, 31,148.), transmission rate regulatory practice continues to 
reflect primarily the cost-of-service model that evolved during what is rapidly becoming 
a bygone era. 
Most of my comments will focus on incentive regulatory mechanisms that would 
be applied to transmission owners, including to independent transmission companies 
(“Transcos”) which may perform the operating functions that are now performed by the 
existing ISOs in California, New England and PJM.  However, I will also provide some 
comments related to the debate about the benefits and costs of not-for-profit ISOs that 
operate transmission facilities owned and maintained by others vs. for-profit Transcos 
that own, maintain, and operate their own transmission facilities.  In my view, the signal 
to noise ratio associated with this debate has not been particularly favorable.  My 
comments will discuss the appropriate analytical framework for the Commission to apply 
in evaluating proposals for alternative RTO organizational and ownership proposals 
rather than attempting to come to a definitive conclusion regarding “the best” 
organizational form for an RTO. 
The success of the ongoing restructuring of the nation’s electricity sector and its 
reliance on decentralized competitive generation service markets depends heavily on the 
                                               
2 Primarily NOPR (Slip. Op. at 198-203).  
3 My comments will use the phrases “performance-based regulation,” “incentive regulation,” and “incentive 
pricing,” interchangeably. 
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existence of a robust transmission network that operates efficiently. Indeed, the 
separation of generation from transmission (via divestiture and new entry of independent 
generators); the unbundling of generation services into multiple financial and physical 
energy, capacity, and ancillary service products; the entry of many new independent 
generation suppliers; the growing role of unregulated energy marketers; the rapid 
expansion of retail competition; and other changes in the structure of the industry, 
requires a more robust transmission network and enhanced operating capabilities than 
was the case during the era of vertically integrated regulated monopolies.4 
Vertical and horizontal disaggregation, combined with the increased freedom that 
individual market participants have to respond to market opportunities in their own self-
interest, makes the efficient operation of the transmission network much more 
challenging than it was under the old paradigm.  As a result, the transition to a 
competitive electricity market with many economic agents pursuing their individual self-
interests requires a more robust and flexible transmission network to yield the best 
feasible performance.  Accordingly, the failure to adopt policies that stimulate the 
development of a robust transmission network with enhanced operating capabilities will 
seriously threaten the ability of the competitive electricity markets that the Commission 
has done so much to encourage to bring sustained benefits to consumers.  The 
performance deficiencies resulting from poor operating and investment incentives will 
appear as higher congestion and “out-of-merit” dispatch costs, higher ancillary services 
costs, increased local market power problems and the need for regulatory intervention to 
mitigate them, increased costs and delays in connecting new generators, reduced 
reliability, and continued pollution from old inefficient generating stations that must be 
operated for reliability purposes as a consequence of transmission congestion and related 
network constraints.  
Continuing to apply the Commission’s historical transmission regulatory 
framework to an industry where the provision of transmission service has or will become 
a stand-alone business unit for many utilities is not likely to foster the kind of robust 
                                               
4 Over ten years ago, the Commission’s “Transmission Policy Task Force” recognized the desirability of 
developing a more robust transmission network to support competitive generation markets.  Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission, “The Transmission Task Force’s Report to the Commission,” October 
1989, page 67 and page 93. 
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transmission networks that are required to support efficient competitive electricity 
markets.  The recent historical evidence suggests that resources devoted to maintaining, 
operating, and expanding the nation’s transmission networks are declining rather than 
increasing in relative terms.5  This should not be surprising.  Historically, major 
transmission enhancements generally accompanied the development of new generating 
resources by vertically integrated utilities (individually or cooperatively with their 
neighbors).  Similarly, the maintenance and operation of transmission and generation 
were closely coordinated within individual vertically integrated firms or joint ventures in 
the form of tight power pools.  The operating and capital costs of transmission were and 
are small relative to the costs of generation,6 and the lead-times for building new 
generating plants were longer than the lead-times for transmission network enhancements 
necessary to support them.  Moreover, for most utilities, the costs of transmission 
facilities were regulated by state commissions as part of the regulation of vertically 
integrated firms supplying their native load retail customers in defined service areas. 
The industry is now well down the path toward a very different industry structure, 
where generation is structurally or functionally separated from transmission, utilities are 
required to operate transmission as a separate business, and a growing fraction of 
transmission costs are becoming subject to Commission rather than state regulation.  
With the new industry structure, the incentive properties of the Commission’s 
transmission regulatory framework will play a far more important role in determining 
resource allocation associated with the supply of transmission services than has been the 
case historically.  The Commission’s traditional transmission regulatory mechanisms that 
may have been satisfactory in the old regime will be unsatisfactory in the new regime.  
Good regulatory mechanisms should provide financial incentives for regulated 
transmission suppliers to operate and expand their systems efficiently.  The regulatory 
mechanisms should lead transmission owners to view the pursuit of public interest goals 
as a business opportunity not as a burden thrust upon them by regulatory command and 
                                               
5 Eric Hirst, Brendan Kirby and Stan Hadley, “Generation and Transmission Adequacy in A Restructuring 
US Electricity Industry,” pages 4-5, June 1999. 
6 In 1996, transmission accounted for about 2% of the operating expenses and 11% of the capital stock of 
the typical vertically integrated utility.  Transmission service accounted for about 6% of the average 
vertically integrated utility’s revenues -- about 4.5 mills/Kwh. 
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control rules.  Accordingly, transmission owners should be subject to regulatory 
mechanisms that make it financially attractive for them to operate there transmission 
networks in a way that minimizes the overall operating costs of the network, including 
both the direct operating and maintenance costs of the network as well as  indirect 
transmission costs associated with congestion, related network operating constraints, 
thermal losses, and ancillary services.  Good transmission regulatory mechanisms will 
make it financially attractive for transmission owners to connect new generators to the 
network as quickly and economically as possible.  Good transmission regulatory 
mechanisms will provide transmission owners with powerful incentives to deepen and 
expand their transmission networks when economic and reliability considerations make 
such investments desirable. 
If the Commission does not act rapidly to develop and apply a transmission 
regulatory framework that is compatible with the changing structure of the electricity 
sector, recent trends in transmission investment are likely to worsen and the cost 
consequences of more constrained transmission networks will become a growing burden 
on consumers. The lead-times for major expansions of transmission capacity are getting 
longer relative to the lead-times for new generating capacity while the demand for 
transmission interconnections from new competitive generators is growing rapidly.  Out-
of-merit dispatch and ancillary service costs are higher than anyone imagined would be 
the case in some of the operating ISOs. Large sums of money have been spent in 
California to deal with real or imagined local market power problems.  Concerns have 
been expressed by some about overinvestment in transmission.  I believe that the 
Commission should be much more concerned about underinvestment and should 
recognize that the societal costs of underinvestment in transmission are much larger than 
the societal costs of overinvestment.  External factors such as licensing requirements, the 
need for rights of way, and NIMBY opposition to transmission infrastructure already 
places significant constraints on overinvestment in major new transmission projects.  
There is no crisis yet, but it is important for the Commission to act now to develop a 
better regulatory framework that will increase the capacity and improve the ability of 
transmission networks to support competitive electricity generation markets.   
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A new regulatory framework for compensating transmission owners is needed to 
support the development of competitive wholesale electricity markets and the efficient 
operation and expansion of the transmission networks upon which these markets depend.  
Transmission regulatory reform should not be viewed primarily as a “carrot” that is 
desirable only as a way to entice reluctant utilities to form and participate in RTOs 
meeting the Commission’s criteria.  Whether or not the Commission were considering 
new RTO rules at this time, it would be highly desirable for the Commission to develop 
and apply new regulatory mechanisms to transmission owners provide them with positive 
financial incentives to operate and expand their transmission networks efficiently.  
Nevertheless, good transmission regulatory mechanisms are likely to be more effective if 
they are applied to transmission owners in the context of an organizational framework 
that satisfies the NOPR’s proposed RTO criteria and the application of good transmission 
PBR mechanisms can help to ensure that the RTOs that are formed meet the 
Commission’s performance expectations. It should also be obvious that if the 
Commission adopts a regulatory framework that is perceived by transmission owners as 
being less profitable than are the state regulatory frameworks which apply to the bulk of 
transmission assets today, whether by providing lower returns or resulting in costs getting 
“trapped” between regulatory jurisdictions, utilities will not be enthusiastic about creating 
and joining RTOs when this involves moving transmission assets from state to 
Commission regulation.7  Accordingly, developing and applying a good performance-
based regulatory framework for transmission service that takes all of these considerations 
into account should be viewed as a high priority output from this proceeding. 
Designing and implementing regulatory mechanisms that make good performance 
profitable and poor performance unprofitable is not easy and all regulatory mechanisms 
require tradeoffs between conflicting goals.  However, there is a large body of theoretical 
research and a growing body of practical experience to draw on that can serve as a very 
useful model for the Commission to build upon.  I will discuss some of this new learning 
                                               
7 I suspect that the Commissions has already heard more than enough on this point in the context of the 
Initial Decision in Southern California Edison Company 86 FERC ¶ 63,014 (1999).  I will not dwell on it 
further except to observe that the Initial Decision’s recommended allowed rate of return and treatment of 
various cost allocation issues certainly received a lot of attention from the folks who we depend on to 
make additional transmission investments. 
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and how it might be applied by the Commission in the following sections of my 
comments. 
There is now a large theoretical and empirical literature that has identified the 
properties of good incentive-based regulatory mechanisms that can be applied to 
regulated monopolies.8  Of course, all regulatory schemes provide incentives to the firms 
to which they apply.  The issues are (a) whether these incentives promote or discourage 
behavior that is consistent with public interest goals and (b) how existing regulatory 
mechanisms can be reformed so that they better achieve these public interest goals.  Even 
the much maligned institution of cost-of-service regulation provided some incentives for 
regulated firms to control their costs as a consequence of regulatory lag (a form on 
implicit “price cap” regulation) and administrative performance reviews.9 
The primary basic goals and constraints that should guide the design of good 
incentive-based regulatory mechanisms include: 
1. Inducing the regulated transmission owner to provide its services efficiently taking 
both cost and quality dimensions of service into account (the supply-side 
efficiency goal).  
2. Providing financial incentives to attract additional capital to the sector to expand 
capacity efficiently and to invest in maintaining the existing capital stock (the 
capital attraction goal or firm viability constraint). 
3. Passing along a large share of the benefits of controlling the direct and indirect costs 
of transmission to consumers in the form of lower prices (the rent extraction goal) 
Providing agents on the supply and demand sides with incentives, through the level and 
structure of prices, to make efficient utilization decisions regarding their use of 
the transmission network (the utilization  efficiency goal).10 
 
                                               
8 Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, MIT Press, 
1993; Mark Armstrong, Simon Cowan, and John Vickers, Regulatory Reform: Economic Analysis and 
British Experience, MIT Press, 1994. 
9 Paul L. Joskow and Richard Schmalensee, “Incentive Regulation for Electric Utilities,” Yale Journal on 
Regulation, Volume 4 (1), 1986,  pages 7-8. 
10 I will not discuss this goal further in these comments.  However, I want to note that the Commission’s 
recent efforts to work with the industry to develop better congestion management mechanisms and the 
criteria for efficient congestion management discussed in the NOPR (Slip. Op. at  162-166, 197-198) are 
consistent with this goal. 
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These goals and constraints cannot all be satisfied simultaneously, pragmatic 
tradeoffs are necessary to develop good practical regulatory mechanisms, and no 
incentive regulatory mechanism can fully replace continuing regulatory oversight.  For 
example, a regulatory process that focuses primarily on ensuring that every last cent of 
potential direct transmission cost reduction is passed along instantly in lower prices to 
purchasers of the services, so that returns on transmission assets are always kept at the 
lowest plausible level within a zone of reasonableness, may do well at “extracting rents” 
from the regulated firm.  However, such a regulatory process is likely to do poorly at 
promoting supply-side efficiency and attracting capital investment to the sector.  Thus, 
while under such a regulatory regime consumers only pay the bare bones direct cost of 
the transmission services provided to them, the overall costs associated with operating 
and expanding the transmission network which consumers end up paying may be much 
too high and the quality of service too low because the transmission owner/operator has 
been given poor incentives to control costs and enhance the network.  At the other 
extreme, a regulatory mechanism could set a very high fixed price for transmission 
services which would never be adjusted in the future, making the regulated supplier the 
residual claimant on all cost increases or decreases over time.  This type of “fixed price 
regulatory contract” provides powerful incentives for the firm to reduce its costs, but may 
provide disincentives to providing high quality service and perform very poorly in 
achieving the rent extraction goal.11  And if cost conditions change and the fixed price 
does not cover even the efficient level of direct transmission costs, the mechanism would 
fail to achieve the capital attraction goal as well.12 
Most good practical incentive-based regulatory mechanisms are hybrid schemes 
that involve tradeoffs between these goals and constraints in light of the importance of 
specific performance goals in specific industry contexts. For example, a typical hybrid 
incentive regulation mechanism often takes the following general form: 
Rt   =  Ct* + g(Ct  - Ct*)  + d(Mt - Mt*) 
                                               
11 Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole,  A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, MIT 
Press, 1993, page 40. 
12 See Richard Schmalensee, “Good Regulatory Regimes,” Rand Journal of Economics,  Vol. 20, 1989, 
pages 417-436 for a useful set of numerical simulations that illustrate these tradeoffs. 
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 where: 
Rt = The revenues that the regulated firm is allowed to recover in the prices it 
charges 
Ct* = A cost target established by regulators for providing service efficiently, 
including return on investment 
Ct = The regulated firm’s realized costs of providing service 
Mt* = A target level for a service quality index (e.g. network availability) 
established by regulators.  The higher is M the better is service quality. 
Mt = The regulated firm’s realized value for the service quality index 
 
    0  <  g   <  1 
    0  <   d  <  1 
This generic linear regulatory mechanism rewards the regulated firm if it can 
reduce its costs below the target Ct*.  The smaller is g, the higher is the power of the 
incentive scheme to reduce costs.13  It also rewards the regulated firm if it can achieve 
service quality levels that exceed the target Mt*. The larger is d, the more powerful is the 
incentive to improve service quality.  One can add to this generic mechanism a cost and 
service quality performance review every few years that could lead to the base revenue 
level and incentive parameters of the regulatory mechanism being adjusted to reflect 
realized performance. Such an adjustment is referred to as a “ratchet.” Ratchets 
necessarily soften incentives for cost reduction and service quality enhancement, but they 
are generally necessary to take into account both the firm viability constraint (e.g. if the 
cost target turns out to be too low) and the rent extraction goal (e.g. if the cost target turns 
out to be far to high) discussed above.  Floors and caps on profits can also be included for 
the same reasons. 
                                               
13 If Ct* where determined  each year by adjusting the current level of costs by an inflation index and a 
productivity index and g and d were set equal to zero we would have the standard “price cap” regulatory 
mechanism.  However, it is important to understand that a pure price cap is one of many possible 
incentive regulatory mechanisms and that if d is zero it will provide poor incentives in the quality of 
service dimension. 
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At this point in the evolution of the US electric power sector, it is important for 
the Commission to give more weight to the supply side efficiency, capital attraction, and 
utilization efficiency goals enumerated above.  The Commission also should redefine the 
way it looks at transmission costs to include both the direct costs of transmission 
(transmission capital and O&M costs) and the indirect costs of transmission (congestion, 
losses, costs of local market power problems, ancillary service costs, etc.).   Reforms in 
all of these dimensions are necessary to provide a regulatory framework that will lead to 
a robust transmission network that operates to facilitate efficient competition in the 
supply of generation services and to convey the benefits of competition to consumers. 
Let me focus first on the way prevailing regulatory procedures deal with 
transmission costs.  The traditional approach to regulating transmission rates is to focus 
on the transmission owner’s direct transmission operating and maintenance costs, the 
appropriate rate of return on the transmission rate base, and the allocation of these and 
other costs between retail and wholesale customers.  As I have already indicated, the 
direct costs of transmission service are a small fraction of the total costs of electricity 
supply, representing about 6% of the average customer’s bill or about 4.5 mills/Kwh on 
average.  The return on equity (including income taxes) associated with transmission 
investment amounts to less than 1 mill/kWh.  As a result, the great efforts the regulatory 
process goes to in order to “fine tune” the allowed rate of return on transmission 
investments is unlikely to be greatly appreciated by consumers.  If the Commission were 
to increase the allowed rate of return on transmission investments by a whopping 50% 
(e.g. from 11% to 16%) it is unlikely even to be noticed by retail consumers since it 
would lead to an increase in the average retail price of less than 1% (about one-half 
mill/Kwh).14  Moreover, regulators will not be doing consumers any favor at all if the 
small price reduction they receive in the short run as a result of regulator’s cutting a 
couple of points off of the expected rate of return on transmission investment destroys the 
transmission owner’s incentives to invest. If the result of inadequate investment 
incentives is to increase congestion costs, increase the incidence of local market power 
                                               
14 This calculation includes the additional income taxes that would be due as a result of a higher allowed 
net return on equity investment. 
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problems, increase ancillary services costs, increase the frequency and magnitude of huge 
energy-price spikes, etc., consumers will be harmed in the long run.  
The transmission rate regulatory process presently is focusing on too narrow a 
definition of costs and does not reflect an appreciation of the social costs of failing to 
provide appropriate incentives to transmission suppliers.  In the vertically and 
horizontally decentralized electricity sector that is rapidly emerging, the Commission 
must consider both the direct and indirect costs associated with the operation of and 
investments in the transmission network in the design and application of transmission rate 
regulatory policies.  The indirect costs associated with the operation and capabilities of 
the transmission network include: the costs of out-of-merit dispatch of generating plants 
to manage congestion and to maintain network frequency, stability, and voltage criteria; 
some of the costs of ancillary services; thermal losses; the societal costs of local market 
power and the costs of regulatory mechanisms aimed at mitigating these costs; the costs 
associated with poor generator location decisions; and excessive costs and delays in 
connecting new generators to the system.  The magnitude of these indirect transmission 
costs in turn will depend on the incentives transmission owners and operators have to 
mitigate them through the choices they make about the operation and maintenance of the 
network as well as when, how, and where they make investments to enhance the 
transmission network’s capabilities. 
The magnitude of these indirect costs can be affected significantly by relatively 
straightforward low-cost transmission operating decisions.  For example, the decision to 
de-energize a transmission line for maintenance affects the ability of some generators to 
supply energy to the network.  The direct maintenance costs of the line may be 
independent of exactly when the maintenance is accomplished.15  But the indirect costs of 
constraints on generation supplies are likely to be much higher during some time periods 
than others.  Efficiency considerations would imply that the latter costs should play a role 
in maintenance decisions.  When we relied on vertically integrated utilities, these kinds of 
tradeoffs were naturally internalized.  In a decentralized system they are not naturally 
internalized.  In a decentralized system a more efficient outcome would result if the 
                                               
15  Alternatively, the line might be returned to service more quickly if maintenance workers are asked to 
work overtime, at added expense. 
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transmission owner and operator were given incentives to take the costs of constraining 
off generators into account when it makes maintenance decisions.  Moreover, absent such 
an incentive mechanism, regulators will get drawn into micromanaging maintenance 
decisions and refereeing disputes between transmission owners and generators. 
Similar opportunities to reduce the indirect costs of transmission exist with regard 
to expanding the capabilities of the transmission network.  Future cost-effective 
transmission investment opportunities will not be dominated by major new transmission 
lines spanning hundreds of miles or traversing pristine areas.  Indeed, the difficulty of 
developing major new transmission corridors in many regions of the country will make it 
necessary for transmission owners to focus on deepening the capabilities of the existing 
network.  There are many potential opportunities to increase the capacity of transmission 
networks, capacity that is often defined by security constraints (e.g. N-2) rather than 
thermal or stability limits.  They vary from no- or low-cost upgrades of the reliability of 
breakers and other components on the network, better monitoring, communication and 
control capabilities, to much more costly investments in static var compensators,  
capacitors, substation enhancements, FACTS technology, and reconductoring of existing 
transmission lines.  In the past, vertically integrated utilities would have (or at least 
should have) naturally internalized the consideration of these opportunities in the context 
of planning to meet growing loads with new generating capacity that they owned.  In the 
new world, where transmission is operated and increasingly owned separately from 
generation, the transmission owner requires incentives to take both the direct costs of 
these opportunities and their indirect costs enumerated above into account and to proceed 
with economical changes in operating procedures and enhancements to the network that 
reflect both the direct and indirect costs of transmission. 
How can the Commission proceed to create a better incentive or performance 
based regulatory environment?  First, the adoption of good PBR mechanisms for 
transmission owners should be viewed as  something that the Commission expects and 
will eventually require, not something that is a privilege.  Second, there is no reason for 
us to reinvent the wheel.  The electricity sector in England and Wales now has nearly a 
decade of experience with incentive-based transmission regulatory mechanisms 
governing the revenues that the National Grid Company (NGC) receives for providing 
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services.16  There is much to learn from this experience.  Of particular interest is the 
Transmission Services Scheme (TSS)17 that provides NGC with financial incentives to 
reduce “transmission uplift” costs (these are costs associated with out-of-merit dispatch 
to manage congestion, thermal losses, and ancillary services costs).18 This regulatory 
mechanism, whose structure has evolved over time, has led to a large reduction in uplift 
costs in the last few years.  Before it was implemented uplift costs increased significantly 
over time. The TSS has created a regulatory environment in which NGC has found it 
profitable to find ways to reduce these costs.  At the same time, those who use the 
network have received the bulk of the benefits in the form of lower uplift charges. 
The important analytical insight embodied in this regulatory mechanism is that it 
gives NGC a financial stake in reducing what I previously referred to as the indirect costs 
of transmission.19  It does so by giving NGC an uplift cost target, rewarding it if it beats 
the target and penalizing it if uplift costs exceed the target.  This approach is broadly 
consistent with theoretical work on optimal transmission regulatory mechanisms.20  The 
experience in England and Wales, as well as economic theory, also makes it clear that a 
standard “price cap” (RPI- x) mechanism applied only to the direct costs of transmission 
service is not a sufficiently comprehensive regulatory mechanism.  This is the case 
because focusing financial incentives only on reducing the direct costs of transmission 
service not only ignores the indirect costs of transmission service but may actually create 
incentives for the transmission owner/operator to behave in ways that lead to an increase 
                                               
16 Richard Green, “Transmission Pricing in England and Wales,” Utilities Policy, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1997, 
pages 185-193.  The details of the current regulatory mechanisms that apply to NGC can be found in the 
“Transmission License for the National Grid Company PLC” which can be downloaded from Offer’s web 
site http://www.open.gov.uk/offer/. 
17 This transmission incentive scheme has been referred to by various names as it has evolved over time.  It 
was initially called the Uplift Management Incentive Scheme and is also referred to  in Offer documents 
as the Transmission Services Incentives Scheme.” 
18 Office of the Electricity Regulator, “Transmission Services Incentives Arrangements From 1998: 
Consultation,” December 1997.  See also  Office of the Electricity Regulator, “Reactive Power Uplift 
Incentive Arrangements From 1999/2000:  Consultation,” December 1998.  These papers can be 
downloaded from Offer’s web site http://www.open.gov.uk/offer/. 
19 Conversely, any regulatory mechanism that allows the transmission owner to profit by increasing 
congestion and other network constraints would be very bad indeed. 
20 Thomas-Olivier Nasser, “Regulation of a Power Transmission Company,” mimeo, July 21, 1999 and 
Thomas-Olivier Nasser, “Imperfect Markets for Power: Competition and Residual Regulation in the 
Electricity Industry” PhD Dissertation, MIT Department of Economics, June 1997, chapter 6. 
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in indirect costs.  The current regulatory scheme in England and Wales integrates a 
conventional price cap mechanism covering the bulk of direct transmission system 
charges, with incentive schemes applicable to transmission uplift costs (costs of 
congestion management, losses, and ancillary services) and reactive power costs, and a 
separate regulatory mechanism governing cost recovery for connecting new generators to 
the system.  Taken together, these regulatory mechanisms have encouraged substantial 
new investment in the network, facilitated generator interconnections, reduced 
transmission uplift costs, while increasing the reliability of the network.21 
The experience in England and Wales strongly suggests that effective incentive 
regulatory mechanisms can be designed and applied to transmission companies in the 
context of competitive markets for generation services.  This does not mean that the 
transmission regulatory mechanisms that have evolved in England and Wales are either 
the only regulatory mechanisms worth considering or necessarily the best regulatory 
mechanisms for application in the US.  Especially in light of the diverse structure of the 
US industry and the varying paces of restructuring in different areas of the country, any 
good incentive regulation mechanism must reflect the structural and behavior attributes 
of the transmission and electricity market systems to which it will be applied.  Clearly, 
however, the experience in England and Wales indicates that developing good incentive 
regulatory mechanisms is both feasible and desirable. 
There has been considerable discussion in the last couple of years about the role 
of “market-based” private initiatives to build additional transmission capacity in return 
for physical or financial transmission rights.  Some have argued that ISO should be 
structured to rely on “the market” to produce economically efficient levels and locations 
for new transmission investments. This discussion reflects the rational desire to move as 
much as possible of the resource allocation decisions in the electricity sector  from 
regulated monopolies to competitive markets.  However, the desirability of this shift in 
governance arrangements requires that reasonably efficient competitive markets can and 
                                               
21 National Grid Company, “Report to the Director General of Electricity Supply,” 1998-99. 
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will evolve for investments to supply the services involved.  I have previously written 
that “[T]ransmission investment decisions do not immediately strike me as being ideally 
suited to relying entirely on the invisible hand.  Transmission investments are lumpy, 
characterized by economies of scale and can have physical impacts throughout the 
network.  The combination of imperfectly defined network property rights, economies of 
scale, long-lived sunk costs for transmission investments, and imperfect competition in 
the supply of generation services can lead to either underinvestment or 
overinvestment....”22  However, I expressed optimism that the primary initiative for 
transmission network upgrades could be left to private parties responding to market 
incentives “... especially where a reasonably good allocation of capacity rights, whether 
physical or financial, is created.” 
My optimism about relying primarily on private market-based initiatives has 
waned with the experience with restructuring in the US and other countries over the past 
few years.  Indeed, proceeding under the assumption that at the present time “the 
market” will provide needed transmission network enhancements is the road to ruin.  
There is abundant evidence that market forces are drawing tens of thousands of 
megawatts of new generating capacity into the system.  There is no evidence that market 
forces are drawing significant entrepreneurial investments into new transmission 
capacity.  While third parties should be given the opportunity to propose market-based 
private initiatives to expand transmission capacity, incumbent transmission owners, in the 
context of a sound RTO/ISO planning process, must be relied upon to play a central role 
in expanding the transmission system.  Increases in transmission capacity that their 
initiatives create, and the associated transmission rights that conform to the protocols 
being applied in their regions, could then be auctioned off to market participants with the 
proceeds used to help to defray the costs of the transmission network.23 
In addition to the barriers to competitive provision of new transmission 
investments  enumerated in the previous paragraphs, there are additional barriers to 
                                               
22 Paul L. Joskow, “Restructuring, Competition and Regulatory Reform in the US Electricity Sector,” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 11, No. 3, page 132.  See also, Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, “The Transmission Task Force’s Report to the Commission,” October 1989, page 164. 
23 It is important that the regulatory framework assure that the transmission owner does not profit directly 
by increasing the value of these rights so that it does not have an incentive to increase congestion. 
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competitive market provision of transmission network upgrades that must be taken into 
account.  Many of the opportunities to enhance the capabilities of the existing 
transmission networks involve a large number of individually relatively small 
enhancements to existing facilities that comprise an integrated network.  These include 
new breakers and switches, better monitoring, communications and control capabilities, 
changes in operating procedures and security ratings, reinforcing existing lines, and 
combinations of all of these.  The primary initiatives for these types of network 
enhancements are best left to the owners of the existing network in the context of good 
RTO/ISO planning processes since the enhancements are often physically and 
economically inseparable from the existing network and its operation.  Moreover, the 
attributes of the electricity restructuring programs around the country, including the 
attributes of congestion management schemes and transmission rights, vary considerably 
from region to region and their future evolution remains controversial and very uncertain.  
In addition, the level and patterns of nodal or zonal prices upon which any market-based 
initiatives must rely are very sensitive to fairly small changes in the security criteria used 
by system operators24 and these criteria and their application are likely to be in flux for 
some time.  These uncertainties and market imperfections will discourage market-based 
transmission investments, at least until we move from a period of experimentation and 
rapid change in institutional arrangements to an era of relative stability.  Failing to 
stimulate efficient network enhancements until such a period of stability is reached will 
be very costly to electricity consumers during what may be a very long transition period. 
As a result, the development and application of good incentive regulation mechanisms for 
transmission owners and operators, within the context of good RTO/ISO transmission 
planning processes, becomes an even more important component of industry 
restructuring than would be the case if one believed that we could rely primarily on “the 
market” to produce efficient patterns of transmission investment. 
These observations do not mean that third-parties should be precluded from 
making proposals for transmission upgrades for consideration by transmission owners, 
RTOs, and regulators.  I simply would not assume that we can depend on these market-
                                               
24 Jacqueline Boucher, Benoit Ghilain and Yves Smeers, “Security-Constrained Dispatch Gives Financially 
and Economically Significant Nodal Prices,” Electricity Journal, November 1998, page 59. 
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based initiatives at the present time to produce the most cost-effective enhancements to 
transmission networks necessary to meet reasonable economic and reliability goals.  The 
transmission owners operating through a sound RTO/ISO transmission planning process 
should be expected to be the primary, but not necessarily the exclusive, source of network 
enhancement initiatives.   
I expect that the Commission will receive numerous comments related to the 
growing debate about the relative costs and benefits of relying on not-for-profit ISOs vs. 
for-profit Transco’s for scheduling and dispatching generators on transmission networks 
to provide energy, ancillary services, manage congestion, and to assure network 
reliability.  This debate raises serious issues and I hope that the Commission will take 
these issues seriously.  However, much of the public rhetoric that has characterized this 
debate confuses a number of different issues and considerations.  Accordingly, I thought 
that I could be most helpful to the Commission by outlining what I believe is a useful 
framework for thinking about these issues. 
The following considerations are relevant for evaluating alternative organizational 
and ownership arrangements to govern the operation of regional transmission networks: 
1. The independence of transmission owners from generators and other active market 
participants utilizing the transmission owner’s facilities.  One of the primary 
rationales for ISOs has been the continued vertical integration between 
transmission and generation in many areas of the country and perceived problems 
associated with enforcing non-discrimination rules in the presence of vertical 
integration between generation and transmission.25  ISOs represent an 
organizational response to the perceived need for a network operator that is 
independent of generators and other active market participants in its region and 
which can accommodate continued vertical integration between generation and 
transmission.  When vertically integrated utilities have divested either their 
generating or transmission assets or turned their control over to independent third 
parties, this rationale for an ISO that is responsible for transmission network 
operations vanishes. 
                                               
25 Another rationale was that ISOs made it possible to move restructuring along much more quickly than 
would have been the case if the Commission or state regulators had (somehow) pursued a policy that 
required the divestiture and horizontal consolidation of transmission assets. 
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2. The benefits of integration of the ownership and maintenance of transmission assets 
with the operation of these assets to schedule and dispatch generators, manage 
congestion, and coordinate with neighboring control areas.  In most countries that 
have gone through electricity restructuring programs, transmission asset 
ownership and the operation of the network are (primarily) handled by the same 
organization.  At the same time, in most of these countries, the transmission 
owner/operator is not involved in generating or trading electricity for its own 
account and its geographical expanse covers all or most of a single synchronized 
network.  There are good reasons to believe that there are potential efficiency 
losses (i.e. higher costs) associated with separating ownership of transmission 
assets from the responsibility for operating these assets.  Indeed, this kind of 
separation of ownership and control is extremely unusual in any other sector of 
the economy.26  Moreover, the separation of ownership from operations makes it 
more difficult to develop and apply good incentive regulatory mechanisms to the 
transmission owner, since it divides decisions that affect the direct and indirect 
costs of transmission between two organizations.  In light of the likely costs of 
separating ownership and maintenance from the operation of the transmission 
network for scheduling, dispatch, and reliability, it is necessary to examine 
whether other considerations create benefits from the separation of ownership of 
transmission assets from the operation of these assets and to evaluate whether the 
benefits exceed the costs. 
3. The extent to which horizontal integration of ownership and control of transmission 
assets internalizes loop flow and other network externalities in a region.  There 
are hundreds of utilities (including municipal, state, federal, and cooperative 
utilities) that own, maintain and operate transmission facilities in the US.  Some 
control large networks and others control very small networks or own pieces of 
transmission networks operated by others.  Because of the decentralized 
ownership of transmission facilities, loop flow and other network effects make it 
possible for an individual transmission owner to behave in ways that impacts 
some or all of the other owners of transmission facilities in its region.  These 
“external” effects may be inconsistent with the overall efficiency of the operation 
of or enhancements to the transmission network.  One of the rationales for 
separate ISOs, is that they provide a single regional organization that can help to 
internalize these network externalities, harmonize the behavior of multiple parties 
with control over portions of the same physical network, and facilitate one-stop 
shopping for transmission service by market participants that rely on facilities 
owned by many parties.27  As the degree of horizontal integration of transmission 
assets serving adjacent geographic areas increases, and the associated potential 
network externalities are internalized within a larger transmission owner/operator, 
                                               
26 There are no ISOs for natural gas pipelines, telephone networks, or railroad networks.  There has been 
some experience with separating ownership of cable television assets from their operation and the 
performance results have generally not been good. 
27  Let me note that ISOs that include only investor-owned utilities may not fully accomplish this 
internalization.  For example, the California ISO does not include parallel transmission facilities owned 
by various public power entities (e.g. LADWP) in the region. 
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the rational for a separate regional operating organization to deal with these 
externality problems declines.   Accordingly, other things equal, the potential 
benefits of a separate ISO are inversely related to the degree to which 
transmission ownership in a region has consolidated enough to internalize loop 
flow and other network externalities. 
4. Incentives, hard budget constraints and ownership form.  The operation of a 
transmission network affects the direct and indirect costs of transmission service.  
Accordingly, we want transmission operators to take the costs and benefits of 
their behavior into account when they make operating and investment decisions.   
They will do so if they are responsible for the economic consequences of their 
actions and their incentives and those of the users of the network are aligned.  
Any organization, whether public or private, for-profit or not-for-profit, that is not 
at least partially responsible for the costs of its actions is unlikely to perform well 
in the long run.  In competitive markets, private for-profit firms are always fully 
responsible for their actions. They face “hard budget” constraints in the sense that 
the market determines the prices they can charge for the goods or services they 
provide and any cost increases or decreases that result from their individual 
actions accrue to their benefit or detriment (they are the “residual claimants” on 
actions that increase or decrease costs).   However, the mere fact that an 
organization is a non-profit does not necessarily imply that it faces no incentives 
to control costs.  Any not-for-profit firm that must “sing for its supper” to earn 
revenues to cover its expenses also faces budget constraints and has some 
incentives to control costs and satisfy its constituents.28  Nevertheless, a not-for-
profit firm’s objectives may be different and more complex from those of a for-
profit firm in the same business.29  As a result, it is more difficult for third parties, 
including the non-profit’s board of directors, to monitor managerial performance 
and to discipline poor performance than is generally the case for a private firm 
whose objective is to maximize profits, whose success can be judged by its 
profitability and its market value, and where the market for corporate control can 
be a powerful mechanism that discipline’s managerial behavior.  
Nor does the private for-profit status of a supplier necessarily lead to good 
performance.  Unregulated private transmission monopolies would face hard 
budget constraints but they also have the incentive and ability to charge excessive 
prices and distort the quality of service.  At the other extreme, regulated private 
transmission monopolies subject to pure cost-plus regulation are also unlikely to 
achieve good performance because they do not face hard budget constraints that 
reward good performance and penalize bad performance.  However, following the 
earlier discussion, we can apply (necessarily imperfect) incentive regulatory 
mechanisms to give regulated private transmission monopolies incentives to 
perform well while constraining monopoly behavior.   
                                               
28 For example, MIT is a private not-for-profit organization.  However, it depends on tuition, research 
grants and contracts, and gifts to cover its expenses each year.  If costs go up, MIT does not have the 
power to “tax” any of these revenue sources to fully cover the cost increases. 
29 Indeed, this is the typical rationale for creating non-profits in areas like education and health care. 
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It is not at all obvious how similar incentive arrangements would be applied to a 
not-for-profit monopoly ISO.  It’s not so much that the ISO is not-for-profit as it 
is that it has the ultimate in soft budget constraints.  It is impossible to make a not-
for-profit ISO itself, as an organization, financially responsible for its actions 
since it has no equity at risk and must have the ability to pass along all of its costs 
to market participants in order to make credible commitments to pay those who 
provide it with services.  The burden then must fall of the ISO’s board of directors 
to establish clear performance goals, to monitor managerial performance in 
achieving these goals, and to reward managers for meeting or beating the goals 
and to penalize them when performance falls short.  In theory, incentive 
compensation arrangements for ISO management could be applied to replicate the 
properties of an incentive regulation mechanism applied to a private firm with 
equity as risk.  In practice, it is difficult to design and implement incentive 
compensation arrangements that are adequate.  Accordingly, we must anticipate 
that getting non-profit ISOs to take the costs and benefits of their decisions 
properly into account will be a continuing challenge for their boards, market 
participants, and regulators. 
5. The desirability of independent regional organizations to monitor market and 
transmission network performance, review transmission upgrade plans and 
proposals, and serve as the initial forum for dispute resolution.  Any monopoly 
Transco that owns the transmission network and has the responsibility for 
operating, maintaining, and dispatching it must be subject to regulation.  A good 
incentive regulation mechanism can go a long way toward making good 
performance profitable and bad performance unprofitable and reducing the need 
for regulatory micromanagement.  However, no incentive regulation scheme is 
perfect or permanent.  The Transco’s performance must be reviewed from time to 
time and the regulatory mechanism adjusted.  Disputes between market 
participants and the network operator will naturally arise and will have to be 
resolved.  A forum for reviewing transmission upgrade plans and to entertain 
competing private initiative proposals will be necessary. Market performance 
must continue to be monitored, though hopefully the intensity of market 
monitoring and the need for adjustments in market rules will decline in the future 
as the kinks are worked out of the system.   The issue is whether the Commission 
should be the regulatory agency that takes primary responsibility for these tasks or 
whether the “first responder” role should be devolved to regional transmission 
organizations, with the Commission playing the role of approving basic policies, 
market rules, and tariff provisions and serving as the ultimate board of appeals for 
disputes that cannot be resolved at the regional level.  If the Commission desires 
to have regional organizations take on these roles, then this is a natural role for an 
RTO to take on even in the presence of regulated private regional Transcos that 
own, maintain and operate the transmission network. 
 
These considerations suggest that the “ISO vs. Transco Debate”  is not so much a 
choice between a not-for-profit ISO/RTO and a for-profit Transco,  as it is a choice about 
the distribution of responsibilities between them.  If the ownership of transmission assets 
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in a region is highly balkanized and vertical integration between transmission and 
generation is extensive then it would appear that ISO/RTOs will need to play a significant 
operating role in the region to meet the Commission’s objectives.  Defining clear 
performance objectives for the ISO, implementing a good governance framework, 
monitoring ISO managerial performance in light of these objectives, rewarding 
management for good performance and disciplining management for poor performance  
will be a difficult but important challenge in this case.  If transmission owners shed their 
control over generating assets and the ownership of transmission assets in a region is not 
highly balkanized so that loop flow and other network externalities are largely 
internalized,  there is a strong case for shifting more operating responsibilities to the 
Transcos, in the context of a good PBR mechanism. The ISO/RTOs independent role 
would then shrink to deal with any remaining significant network externalities or 
boundary problems and to encompass the non-operational monitoring, review, and 
dispute resolution tasks enumerated above. 
The RTO NOPR embodies a sound vision for the next stage in the development of 
an efficient and reliable U.S. electric power sector that relies as much as is reasonably 
possible on competitive markets.  A robust transmission system that serves as an efficient 
platform to support wholesale and retail competition is essential if this vision is to be 
realized.  I respectfully urge the Commission to take my Comments into account as it 
develops a Final Rule. 
Conclusion 
